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Since a person's continual employment is 
directly tied to his boss' success, patronage 
hiring also helps guarantee something always 
sought in politics and rarely found - loyalty 
(Ferrick, 1984, p. 6- B). 
This statement by the Philadelphia Inguirer captures the 
essence of patronage politics as it exists in the United 
States. Government decision-makers use patronage not 
only to motivate them to contribute campaign funds and 
participate in campaign activities, but also to create a 
group of loyal and faithful followers. In doing so, 
politicians give some of the government's resources to 
the public employees in hope that they will give 
something back in the form of campaign participation. 
Public employees were mobilized to keep the governing 
party in power. 
The role of government in American society has grown 
steadily over the past two score years. Between 1950 and 
1975, state and local governments expanded faster than 
any other sector of the economy. State and local 
government rose from 9.1% to 15.5% of total 
non-agricultural employment during that period of time. 
unionization has also grown more rapidly in the public 
sector than in the private sector. State and local 
government collective bargaining began with a 1959 state 
law in Wisconsin. In 1970, Pennsylvania state employees 
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got the right to bargain collectively and a limited right 
to strike . By 1976, 27.7% of state and local government 
employees were covered by a formal union 
(Ehrenberg, 1982). 
contract 
Patronage politics and government behavior , in 
general, lend themselves to economic model building and 
empirical analysis. They both require human processes to 
function. They are human institutions shaped and 
molded by people . Because human beings are so vital a 
part of government and the behavior of decision-makers 
within that institution, assumptions of self-interest and 
the rational man lead to important implications which are 
necessary to the understanding and reshaping of 
government in order for it to work for the "common good. " 
Only by understanding the framework of government and 
presenting an accurate picture of human behavior within 
that framework can we begin to predict the consequences 
of people's actions in real-life situations. 
The author of this paper attempts to increase our 
understanding of government behavior by predicting the 
consequences of patronage and political behavior on wage 
determination in the public sector. Chapter 2 begins 
this pursuit with a descriptive analysis of the uses, 
decline, and changes in patronage. W. Robert Gump 
(1971) and Frank Sorauf (1960) discuss the myriad uses of 
patronage. These include: religious recognition, reward 
to central committeemen, maintenance of intra-party 
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cohesion, and the stimulation of campaign effort. Gump 
(1971) found that patronage was of some value in 
maintaining party organization, getting campaign 
contributions, and eliciting general campaign effort. 
Sorauf documented the decline of patronage due to the 
rise of merit systems, unionization, and U.S. Supreme 
court rulings prohibiting dismissal of non-civil service 
employees. 
Patronage has fallen into public disfavor for 
appearing to approach an outright political 
payoff, with the result that its usefulness to 
the parties has diminished (Sorauf, 1960, p. 
60) . 
Finally, Sorauf (1956) discusses the changes in patronage 
due to this decline. 
Chapter 3 examines three comprehensive models of 
government behavior: Anthony Downs (1957), Melvin Reder 
(1975), and Bernard F. Lentz (1976) . Downs assumes that 
men act rationally and governments maximize votes. The 
existence of uncertainty in the political system leads to 
persuasion by those who are confident about the 
information available to them. Downs suggests that 
uncertainty allows some voters to have more influence in 
government than others. He believes it is rational to 
abstain from voting when the costs outweigh the returns. 
Melvin Reder presents a highly theoretical model of 
vote maximization. Reder implies that wage differentials 
between government and private sector workers may be due 
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to the extra effort required on the part of public 
employees to produce votes. Finally, Bernard Lentz goes 
into greater detail formulating a model of public wage 
determination that takes into account the political 
processes of patronage, collective bargaining, and civil 
service. In an econometric analysis of county pay in New 
York, Lentz (1981) found that the two largest 
determinants of county pay rates were the plurality 
party's percent of total registration and the patronage 
proportion of total classified employment. 
Chapter 4 examines more closely wage differential 
theory and empirical analysis. Fogel and Lewin (1974) 
argue that the existence of prevailing wage principles in 
government wage setting "produce upwardly biased wage 
rates for most government jobs" (Fogel, 1974, p. 413). 
Sharon smith of Princeton University shows empirically 
that public sector wages exceed private sector wages. At 
the state level, male state employees are paid eight 
percent more than comparable private workers. On the 
other hand, female state employees are paid 25% more than 
comparable female private workers. 
Chapter 5 looks at the role of patronage in 
Pennsylvania politics. It briefly describes the role of 
civil service and collective bargaining in Pennsylvania. 
The growth of state employment and the percentage of 
state employees that are civil service are examined. 
Pennsylvania state employees' relative earnings are 
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higher than those in New Jersey state government and 
comparable private sector workers. Lastly an econometric 
analysis confirms the notion that vote switching occurs 
as a result of political pressure put on non-civil 
service employees in state government . The author hopes 
that those who read this paper will acquire a better 
understanding of state government in Pennsylvania and the 




DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF PATRONAGE 
Patronage has been defined in many different ways. 
Frank Sorauf (1960) of Penn State University stated that 
"patronage is best thought of as an incentive system a 
political currency with which to purchase political 
activity"(p. 28). He said it was used to maintain 
active party organization, to reward workers, and to 
motivate them to do such things as canvass neighborhoods , 
raise campaign funds, and help on election day. W. 
Robert Gump (1971) has defined patronage more 
specifically as "any job for which appointment was 
cleared by some member or members of the 
organization"(p. 92) . 
USES OF PATRONAGE 
party ' s 
In the past, patronage was used because it served 
many beneficial purposes. Where it exists today, it 
continues to be used in the same manner. Gump (1971) did 
a study on the various uses of patronage by county 
committee chairmen in Ohio. He interviewed a random 
sample of 25 Ohio county chairmen. A mail questionaire 
was sent to the uninterviewed chairmen of county 
executive committees. Supplemental interviews were 
comp l eted with other state level party personnel. 
(19 71) said that there was a 
Gump 
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persistent bias associated with a higher 
response rate from smaller counties and with 
under representation of majority party chairmen 
because of their slightly lower response rate 
(p . 91). 
The first use Gump (1971) mentioned was to build up 
county chairmen's personal followings. However, he said 
it was "of moderate value at best" because of the 
apparent lack of enthusiasm and consistency in its use. 
party chairmen used patronage in some instances to 
attract voters and convert them into lifelong supporters. 
"In some urban areas of Pennsylvania, experienced party 
men calculate that a well-placed appointment should net 
the party between six and eight votes"(p. 29) • He 
included the use of racial recognition , but said that 
only one-third of the county chairmen reported giving 
attention to this phenomenon. The remaining two- thirds 
said that Negroes were so small a fraction of the 
population that there was no need for particular 
attention. 
Gump ( 1 971) mentioned other uses. He examined the 
use of religious recognition, but found that it was 
rejected by n i ne out of ten chairmen . He also looked at 
the use of patronage as an incentive and reward to 
central committeemen (precinct and township leaders) . 
Over 90% of the chairmen said they wou l d give preference 
to these men. The idea was to give preference to 
l oyalists in appreciation of their service to the party. 
However , one - third said they had to disappoint 
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committeemen because of either a lack of qualifications 
or the scarcity of 
promote intra-party 
jobs. Another common use was to 
cohesion and unity (Sorauf, 1960). 
Patronage was used with the county board of elections to 
"sustain [the] nucleus of the party's organization and 
communication network"(Gump, 1971, p. 101). 
Despite all of these uses, the overwhelming and most 
important use was to stimulate campaign effort by 
jobholders and jobseekers. It was reported that 'party 
headquarters and the precincts swarm with patronage 
persons who perform the myriad tasks of campaigning' 
(Sorauf, 1971, p. 94). As Table 1 shows, the most 
frequent campaign activity engendered was that of 
persuading friends and family to vote for a particular 







Republicans were more successful at motivating behavior 
in all categories but circulating nominating petitions 




Percentage of Chairmen Using Some Patronage Grantees 
For Campaign Tasks, By Party 
Task Rep. Oem. Tot. 
Persuading friends to support ticket 
Envelope stuffing and mailing 
Putting up posters 
Auto transportation 
Precinct canvassing to get out the vote 
Circulate nominating petitions 
Telephone solicitations 
Soliciting campaign contributions 
(Number of Observations) 




























seventy- two percent of the county chairmen said that 
they expected some campaign activity, but that 
expectations were low and workers were not forced to do 
so. In many cases, the expectation was implicit. Gump 
said that "greater Republican reliance on patronage" 
seems to be due to access rather than background (Gump, 
1971, p. 95). The Republicans were in power at the time 
of the survey. In many cases, incentives to campaign 
were materially insufficient and administered so badly 
that potential rewards were either dissipated or not 
desired by the party. 
Eliciting campaign contributions used to be an 
important function of patronage. In its heyday, five 
percent of a state employee's salary went to the party. 
One of the most remarkable findings of Gump's study was 
that the parties did so little to persuade patronage 
employees to contribute. Eighty-two percent of 
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Republicans and 68% of Democrats said there was no 
follow-up activity to non - responders to requests for 
contributions. In conclusion, Gump said: 
the Ohio finding s indicate that 
overwhelming majority of jobs 
original preferment not the job 
valuable resource for the chairmen 
p. 106) . 
for the 
it is the 
which is a 
(Gump, 1971, 
He found that patronage was of some value in maintaining 
party organization, getting campaign contributions, and 
eliciting general campaign effort. 
There is some additional support for the proposition 
that patronage is more valuable to the lower - status party 
(Democrats) than the higher - status party (Republicans). 
"Restrictions on patronage weaken the Democratic party 
more than the Republicans" (Sorauf, 1960, p. 92). 
Because Republicans have greater substitutes due to their 
social class and availability of jobs, restrictions on 
patronage simply force Republicans to use other means of 
vote getting often not available to Democrats. Frank 
Sorauf (1960) says that patronage has the highest value 
in areas plagued by high unemployment. 
DECLINE OF PATRONAGE 
In recent years, there has been a drastic decline in 
the use of patronage due to many factors. Merit systems 
have made inroads into the well-paid, specialized 
positions where training is of the greatest value. Some 
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of the low-paid, less skilled positions remain for 
patronage. Economic prosperity and high levels of 
employment have further limited the usefulness of non-
civil service positions. patronage has become viewed as 
a "short term desparation job alternative" (Sorauf, 1960, 
p. 60) . It has lost its respectability. The mores of 
the middle-class do not tolerate mediocrity in government 
anymore. A patronage position is viewed as a naked quid 
E££ ~ which is not a natural part of politics. 
Patronage has fallen into public disfavor for 
appearing to approach an outright political 
payoff, with the result that its usefulness to 
the parties has diminished (Sorauf, 1960, p. 
60). 
The political boss, machine, and politics of the 
underpriviledged are on the decline as a result of rising 
levels of prosperity and declining numbers of 
unassimulated groups. Despite the explosive growth of 
government bureaucracy in recent years, the amount of 
patronage has drastically declined due to civil service, 
merit systems, and unions. pennsylvania lost almost 
50,000 patronage jobs in 1970 to collective bargaining. 
In 1971, almost 17,500 workers, mostly in Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation, negotiated a contract in 
which the state agreed not to discriminate against 
employees on the basis of political affiliation. The 
contract also forbid the state from requiring workers to 
make political contributions and engage in political 
activity (Sorauf, 1984). 
Page 16 
At the same time, important legal interpretations 
concerning patronage have prohibited political firings of 
non-civil service employees . Two United states supreme 
Court rulings said that patronage dismissals violated the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
(Sorauf, 1984). The case of Elrod ~ Burns 427 U.S. 
347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) 
declared unconstitutional the dismissal of 
nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential state and 
local government employees solely on the ground 
that they were not affiliated with or sponsored 
by a particular political party (Lockhart, 
1981, p. 472). 
The case involved a newly elected Illinois Cook 
County Sheriff, Elrod, who was a Democrat and several 
Republican non-civil service employees whom Elrod fired. 
Burns alleged infringement of First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights and violation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871. In order to keep their jobs, the employees had to 
either pledge political allegience to the Democratic 
party, contribute a portion of their wages to the party, 
or obtain the sponsorship of a member of the party for a 
price. The court held that: 
patronage, therefore, to the extent it compels 
or restrains belief and association, is 
inimical to the process which undergirds our 
system of government and is 'at war with the 
deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the 
Fourteenth Amendment'· (Ducat, 1974, p. 1360). 
Page 17 
The justifications put forth and rejected by the 
court to support patronage were: 1) the need to insure 
effective government, 2) the need for political loyalty 
among employees in order to assure implementation of a 
new administrations policies, and 3) the preservation of 
the democratic process. The court believed there were 
less restrictive means available to insure effective 
government (not excluding discharge for good cause when 
available). In answer to the second justification, the 
court believed that limiting patronage dismissals to 
policymaking positions was sufficient to achieve the 
governmental end of political 
court felt that political parties 
the unconstitutionality of 
(Lockhart, 1981). 
loyalty . Finally, the 
will survive despite 
patronage dismissals 
The second important case is Branti ~ Finkel 180 
S.Ct 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d. 574 (1980) which broadened the 
scope of coverage from dismissal under Elrod ~ Burns. 
Branti was a newly appointed public defender. Finkel was 
an assistant public defender who was fired because of his 
Republican affiliation. This man was neither a 
policymaker nor a confidential employee (Ducat, 1974). 
The court found that it did not matter whether you were a 
policymaker or a confidential employee; what mattered was 
"whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the public office involved" 
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(Lockhart, 1981 p. 474). The Democratically controlled 
county legislature could not discharge public defenders 
who were satisfactorily performing their duties, and who 
were neither policymakers nor confidential employees. 
Party affiliation, the court said, has no bearing here. 
Gump (1971) noted in his survey of Ohio county 
chairmen that most chairmen failed to enforce patronage 
turnover even without these court cases because of 
humanitarian considerations, the need for task 
performance, or recruitment difficulty. Gump said that 
chairmen rarely fire patronage workers for actions which 
are contrary to the party. "The patronage system proves 
to be slack; unused resources are commonplace, and 
maximum utilization of resources is uncommon" (Gump, 
1971, p. 100). 
CHANGES ~ PARTY POLITICS 
Changes have occured in the political process as a 
result of the drastic decline in patronage and legal 
interpretations that preclude employee dismissal due to 
political affiliation. There has been a move toward 
centralization, mass media, and advertising, and away 
from canvassing and local rallying. There has been more 
emphasis on issues rather than favors, patronage, and 
preferment. The system that has emerged is clearly more 
compatible with middle class values of suburbia. Today, 
there are volunteer and ad hoc political groups, and 
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persons motivated by belief, loyalty, and civic duty. 
There are interest groups, labor unions, and political 
action committees. Sorauf said: 
men and women are drawn into politics by a 
combination of motives; these include power, 
glory, zeal for contention or success, duty, 
hate, oblivion, hero worship, curiosity, and 
enjoyment of the work (Sorauf, 1960, p. 31). 
They are drawn by some psychological need whether it be a 
release from daily routine or the triumph of an ideal. 
The party needs trained, educated , and experienced 
people, but often patronage jobs are not available to 
these types of people. There are frequent shortages of 
lower level management and supervisory positions. Most 
people who seek these positions prefer full-time pay for 
part -time work so that they can manage campaigns part of 
the year. Appointments are usually to those who just 
want a job, and such appointments do not give the party 
much benefit. At the top, it is hard to fill the few 
highly skilled professional jobs (Sorauf, 1960). 
In his study of patronage appointments in the 
Department of Transportation, Sorauf (1956) discovered 
two distinct patronage systems. The first was the 
appointment of caretakers who were better-paid, showed 
greater party activity, and were more loyal partisans. 
The second consisted of the lower-paid less-attractive 
laborers who showed less party and political activity. 
As the desirability of the job decreased, the apparent 
political value decreased. The demand for the lower-paid 
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jobs was so feeble that the party had to actually solicit 
workers to fill the positions. In the jobs where the 
skills necessary were scarce, political appointees would 
be kept on the job from one administration to another 
(Sorauf, 1956). 
Sorauf's study took place in Centre County, 
Pennsylvania. He believed that highway jobs were 
important to local spoils. Eight months after the 
Democrats won in 1954, the normal replacement of 
positions began. He interviewed 89% of the 138 workers 
who were Republican and on the payroll at the time of the 
last election (Sorauf, 1956). 
Sorauf initially noticed after scrutinizing the 
registration and voting records that the Republican party 
had only partial success in creating a bloc of solidly 
Republican voters. Only 14% had changed their 
registration to Democrat after the 1954 election in hope 
of keeping their jobs. Only 70% were lifelong 
Republicans; only 48% professed to vote in every 
election. As a rough index of political activity, only 
24% had rendered the party one type of service or 
another. Twenty- four percent campaigned for the party -
most of which was hauling voters to the polls. 
Sorauf concluded that the Republicans were "more 
effective using the job as leverage for extracting 
political activity after appointment" (Sorauf, 1956 , p. 
1049). Many contributed to the party. 




contributions, and 6% refused to answer the question. 
However, the median contribution was probably less than 
five dollars per worker for a total of no more than three 
or four hundred dollars. The party did show a 
determination to earn a dividend on appointments. The 
superintendent solicited political contributions during 
working hours, and some party chairmen dispatched 
caretakers on election day to bring distant voters to the 
polls . 
As was mentioned earlier , the better-paid caretakers 
were more partisan and politically active, frequently 
life-long Republicans, and more regular money 
contributors; they accounted for over half of those who 
held party office (Sorauf, 1956). The workers still on 
the job after the election showed less partisan loyalty, 
exibited shorter periods of political activity, held 
fewer political discussions, made more registration 
changes, and were usually skilled workers. In ski lled 
positions such as heavy equipment operator, the need to 
have jobs filled outweighed partisanship. Sorauf 
encountered a hostile attitude among jobholders toward 
the patronage system. Patronage employees in the 
Department of Transportation lacked a clear impression 
that their jobs were political, did not feel that they 
owed the party anything, and favored civil service. 
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"Under these circumstances, it certainly is not amazing 
that the political uses of highway jobs have 
been haphazard and partial (Sorauf, 1956, p. 1055). 
The change s due to the decline of patronage and the 
inefficiency in th~ maintenance of the spoils system are 
substantial. As a direct result of the need to attract 
well-educated, middle - class activists and the deficiency 
of the patronage system to do so , the political "non-job" 
has arisen . Political leaders have devised a way of 
bestowing status symbols and rewards without the job 
itself. The ' honorary ' may be a nomination to a 
governor's advisory committee or an invitation to a 
reception at the governor ' s mansion. In the en~, the 
goals of motivating party workers to contribute campaign 
funds and elicit campaign effort are the same; the means 
are simpl y a little different (Sorauf, 1984). 
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Chapter 3 
ECONOMIC MODELS OF GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 
Many economic models exist that attempt to explain 
government behavior. Each one has its own virtues and 
limitations , but all add something to our understanding 
of government and public wage determination. Anthony 
Down ' s seminal work entitled An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957) hypothesized that government decision 
makers maximize votes just as firms maximize profit. 
Downs begins with common assumptions of human behavior 
such as people behave rationally and act in their own 
self- interest and finishes with a theory on government 
behavior that takes into 




In The Theory of 
Emp l oyment and Wages in the Public Sector, Melvin Reder 
presents a more theoretical model of vote maximization 
that goes even further to predict government behavior. 
Lentz closely examines the assumption that politicians 
maximize long - run expected voter support and provides 
empirical evidence supporting his claims. Finally, 
Ronald Ehrenberg presents some additional information 
regarding supply and demand of public employees. 
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ANTHONY DOWNS 
Anthony Downs' fundamental idea is: 
Yet, just as firms that do not 
rational pursuit of profit are 
be firms, so politicians who 
votes in a rational manner are 
be politicians (Downs, 1957). 
engage in the 
apt to cease to 
do not pursue 
apt to cease to 
He assumes that politicians, just as firms, are rational 
beings as a matter of necessity. The rational man refers 
to someone who moves toward a goal with imperfect 
knowledge while using the least possible inputs of scarce 
resources per unit of output. This, as always, does not 
mean that a rational man thinks exclusively in logical 
propositions ; nor does it mean that he has no emotions or 
prejud ices. As long as an individual maximizes output 
while minimizing input to the best of his knowledge, he 
is rational (Downs, 1957, p. 5). 
Further assumptions are that government seeks to 
maximize political support, most likely in the terms of 
voting power. The government's primary goal is 
reelection, and the goal of the out-of-power party is to 
gain control of the government by winning an election. 
At each election, the party that receives the most votes 
controls the entire government. The governing power has 
unlimited freedom within the bounds of the constitution 
to maximize votes. In addition, government secures its 
goals under a democratic government which allows parties 
to compete, an atmosphere of uncertainty, and an 
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electorate of rational voters. To put it simply , parties 
act to maximize votes , and people behave rationally. 
As in classical economic models, the assumption at 
the core of the model is that every individual is 
selfish. Rational behavior means that behavior is 
directed toward selfish ends. John C. Calhoun once said 
that because we feel more intensly about things that 
affect us directly, we run into conflicts with others . 
We are ready to sacrifice the interests of others to 
satisfy our own interests (Downs, 1957, p. 27). From 
this axiom, we assume that political party members act 
solely "in order to attain the income, prestige , and 
power which come from being in office" (p. 28). 
Therefore, in the model, po liticians never seek to carry 
out certain policies. Their goal is to acquire the 
rewards of office per se. Social functions are usually 
by-products of human action of which private ambitions 
are the means. 
The importance of self-interest in the model neither 
precludes charity and selfishness nor altruism. The 
assumption is that government workers carry out their 
roles in the division of labor as a means of serving 
their own self interests. Politicians are motivated by 
the desire for power, prestige and income. They are vote 
maximizers of which social ends are the by-products of 
the democratic process. 
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uncertainty 
One of Downs' major contributions to public sector 
wage determination and government behavior was his 
concept of uncertainty. He defined uncertainty as "any 
lack of sure knowledge about the course of past, present, 
future, or hypothetical events" (p. 77). He said 
uncertainty varies in 1) removability, due to acquisition 
of new information; 2) intensity, expressed by the degree 
of certainty or confidence of the voter; and 3) relevance 
about whether the information applies to the situation or 
not. The degree of confidence with which a voter makes a 
decision depends on how much information he has. The 
more confident a man is, the less information he needs or 
wants. In other words, "The marginal returns from this 
use of data rapidly diminish toward zero" (p. 78). 
However, uncertainty is irrelevant to a given decision if 
either the decision is trivial or the uncertainty 
concerns knowledge not germane to the decision. 
Downs (1957) made a distinction between reason, 
contextual knowledge, and information. He defines reason 
as "facility with the processes of logical thought and 
principles of causal analysis" (p. 79). In contrast, 
contextual knowledge is the "cognizance of the basic 














ignorance, which is costly to diminish because education 
is required to eliminate it. 
The presence of uncertainty in the world causes 
voters to be classified based on levels of confidence and 
gives rise to persuasion among some voters. "In an 
uncertain world, it is irrational for a democratic 
government to treat all men 
politically equal" (p. 83) . 
as though they were 
With uncertainty comes 
influence and persuasion. Persuaders do not want to help 
people become certain about helping their cause. 
Persuaders produce facts which , although they are not 
false , tend to leave out some truth and lead to a 
specific conclusion. Assuming rationality, only 
individuals who have made up their own minds can persuade 
others . 
Uncertainty renders voters willing to be persuaded 
by leaders who know - how to reach social goals people 
approve of. "Leadership we define as the ability to 
influence voters to adopt certain views as expressing 
their own will" (p . 87) . Leaders are partially 
motivated by the possibility of acquiring some direct 
benefit for themselves . Downs divides these leaders into 
three groups: 
favor buyers. 
themse l ves and 
political parties, interest groups, and 
Favor buyers represent no one except 
trade their influence over voters for 
specific acts they want performed . These intermediaries 
between government and the people it serves simplify the 
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task of determining what is a good or bad society. 
Uncertainty helps to convert democracy into 
representative government by creating a need for these 
intermediaries. As a result, government does those 
things that people already approve of or would support if 
they were informed. 
Because government needs to convince people that its 
policies are good ones and defend against the opposition, 
and this requires money, the government sells favors to 
men who are willing to pay for them through campaign 
contributions, political influence, campaign effort, or 
some other form of agitation. Possession of resources 
other than the vote affects voters' influence 
coefficient. Government makes policy toward those with 
higher influence coefficients than others (p . 93). 
Downs (1957) said it best by stating: 
Uncertainty allows unequal distributions of 
income , position, and influence - all of which 
are inevitable in any economy marked by an 
extensive division of labor to shove 
sovereignty in a realm where only the equal 
distribution of votes is supposed to reign (p. 
94) . 
Finally, the existence of uncertainty restricts the 
voter ' s ability to relate government policies to his view 
of a good society. Therefore, knowledge of a party ' s 
ideology allows him to cut information costs by allowing 
him to make a voting decision without knowing every 
policy specifically . Parties maintain specific 
ideologies in order to gain support by most voters 
Page 29 
because they realize that voters wi ll pay attention to 
them. A party ' s ideology must both bear close relation 
to its actions and develop without repudiating former 
acts. 
Rational Abstention 
Another significant contribution of Downs was his 
theory of rational abstention where a voter rationally 
abstains from voting if the costs outweigh the returns of 
voting. Downs comments that " ... the returns to voting 
are usually so low that tiny variations in its cost may 
have tremendous effects on the distribution of political 
power" (p. 266). This would explain why holding 
elections on holidays, keeping polls open late, providing 
free rides, and counting on good weather may strikingly 
affect election results. A voter 's total return from 
voting depends upon his benefit from democracy, how much 
he wants one party to win over another, how close he 
thinks the election will be, and how many other citizens 
he thinks will vote . 
It is sometimes rational for a citizen to vote 
even when his short-run costs exceed his 
short-run returns because social responsibility 
produces a long-run return (p. 273). 
Downs provided an explanation of why low-income 
voters often abstained more than high-income voters . 
Firstly, the cost of voting is harder for low-income 
voters to bear, even when returns are equal among the two 
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groups . Secondly, the cost of information is harder for 
low-i ncome citizens to bear, and more of them are 
uncertain. Furthermore, information costs would most 
likely keep more low-income voters away despite equal 
costs of voting. Lastly (one which Downs failed to 
include) , the returns of participating in government may 
be less for low-income groups because they have less at 
stake in society. 
The basic assumption underlying Reder's model is 
that all decision makers are utility maximizers under 
static conditions. This means, more specifically, that 
they act as if there is no difference between present and 
expected future values of variables subject to their 
control. These decision makers are utility maximizers 
with no political rent (Reder, 1975, p . 2). The term 
"comparable workers" means those workers who are alike in 
embodied human capital such as age, years of relevant 
experience , and years of schooling. They have similar 
tastes such that hourly pecuniary wage differentials 
between jobs are equalized by the tastes and preferences 
of the worker. In addition, they are similar in 
location. 
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Reder states "that normally political factors are 
important in determining government wage employment 
decisions" (Reder, 1975, p. 4). utility is a function 
of the expected number of votes and "ideological 
parameters determined exogenously." Reder defines utility 
by the function: U = F(V, at , .... , a'l.)' An increase in 
votes leads to an increase in utility. A trade-off 
exists between attracting votes and pursuing ideological 
objectives . Reder states that: 
The government gets utility not only by adding 
to its votes but also by avoiding (engaging) in 
certain types of actions that it considers 
ideologically offensive (attractive) (p. 5). 
The government choses an optimal mix of disposable 
dollars and votes to reach optimal utility given the 
constraint of political resource endowment. This 
assumption is that the marginal rate of substitution 
between dollars and votes equals the rate at which they 
can be exchanged for each other. 
vote Maximization 
According to Melvin Reder's model: 
v F(Q(p), p, x" x.l' xJ ' T, C, 5, w,, w~, r) Equation 
1 







guantity of public goods 
price of public goods 
inputs to production 
tax payments by taxpayers 
payments to citizens 
(not factor payments) (p. 7) 
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In this model, Q = Q(p) is the demand curve. Because the 
voter likes government more as the price of that 
government drops, V < 0 is assumed . At a lower p, more 
voters are in favor of the government. As T increases , 
the number of voters in favor of the government declines; 
as S increases, the number of voters in favor of the 
government increases. Reder assumes that government 
adjusts output to stay on the demand curve. Therefore, Q 
is determined once p is set. 
Price changes affect the number of votes in favor of 
the government. A drop in price necessitates an increase 
in outlays to factor inputs when the supply of quantity 
demanded at MC P is constant. This leads to an 
increase in taxes which tends to reduce the number of 
votes. At the same time, as the price drops, outlays 
increase to some people who receive those dollars. This 
increases V among buyers of the product (p. 8). 
Contrributions depend on taxes, payments to 
citizens, and the price of government: Ci = ci(Ti, Si, 
p), where i is any indi vidual. There are both direct and 






a price change on contributions of 
if Q(p) injures purchasers or 
respond directly by reducing 
reduction in contributions will 
indirectly lead to a reduction in votes (p. 9). 
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When Q = G(x " x;a.' x.J} is put into Equation I , the 
equation that results is: 
V = F(X" ~, x)' p , T, C, S, w" w~ , r} Equation 2 
This leads to Reder ' s ultimate underlying concept that an 
impact on X affects Q which affects V which , in turn, 
affects U. An effect on inputs affects output which , in 
turn , influences votes , which ultimately affects the 
utility of government. The effect of X on V "arises from 
encouraging or even requiring as a condition of 
employment that pub lic sector empl oyees furnish political 
campaign labor" (p. ll). 
The marginal product of X, MP , will be lower in the 
public sector than in the private sector when pay is 
equal but when pub lic employees spend time on political 
activity . statutes that punish political activity by 
public employees function as a tax upon employees' time 
that may reduce or eliminate political activity. "Taxes 
or requlations on contributions tend to encourage the use 
of public funds to 'overpay ' public employees as an 
indirect method of producing vo tes" (p. l3). 
There are various ways to produce votes . The most 
direct way is to spend money on employees so that they 
produce votes or contributions. The government may pay 
higher wages so that the excess will be paid back in 
contributions. Another way of producing votes and 
contributions is to sell jobs to intermediaries. For 
example, a job may be given to the son of a banker in 
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order to induce the banker to contribute campaign funds. 
In this instance, the job is not an end in and of itself; 
it serves solely as a means to greater vote production. 
As long as the government has utility and increases in 
expected number of votes increase the chance of political 
success, then the "marginal vote product" must be 
positive for all methods of vote production in use. All 
marginal vote products of cash contributions, vote 
producing activity, and the hiring of someone to vote 
produce must all be equal (p. 14). 
Implications of Vote Maximization 
These premises and propositions have important 
implications in public wage determination. 
comments: 
If the marginal vote product is positive, and 
the marginal nonvote products in the public and 
private sectors are equal, the hourly wage rate 
in the public sector must exceed that in the 
private sector for labor embodying equal 
quantities of human capital (Reder, 1975, p. 
16) • 
Reder 
In other words, if the marginal products of public and 
private workers are the same while excluding vote 
production in the public sector, and the public worker is 
involved in vote production so that his marginal vote 
product is above zero, then the public worker will be 
paid relatively more than a comparable private sector 
worker. To put it simply, wage differentials between 
government and private sector workers may be due to the 
Page 35 
extra effort needed to produce votes. Therefore, public 
sector workers may not actually have true higher wages. 
Reder's theory of vote maximization leads to 
peculiar behavior in the public sector. Jobs may be sold 
to vote-getters or intermediaries who allow access by 
another. The job may be given to a man whose abilities 
and training would not be adequate for a comparable 
position in the private sector. Favoritism to the 
handicapped, minorities, and veterans is prevalent. 
Fluctuations in the job market and vacancies make 
filing positions and the quality of applicants vary 
widely (p. 18). Short-term goals of a politician to win 
an imminent election create a tendency to run deficits 
and neglect long-term debts. Frequent separation of 
responsibility for raising funds from the authority to 
spend them in the public sector leads a politician to 
spend more than would be rational in the private sector. 
Furthermore, because some jobs in the public sector carry 
nonpecuniary benefits of doing good for society, "the 
effect ... is to make public sector wage rates .•. lower 
than" their private counterpart (p. 28). 
Government may subsidize or engage in public 
production of otherwise failing enterprises because they 
provide an essential public service or there is a need to 
preserve jobs. 
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Political consideration will lead governments 
to avoid reduction in force and/or wage 
reductions that profit seekers would require as 
a condition of continuing operations .... This 
makes for relatively smaller variance and 
probable higher average earnings in the public 
than in the private sector (p. 30). 
Fin~lly , public employers often avoid activities that 
involve payment by results. Workers with equal amounts 
of human capital who are willing to accept relatively low 
earnings in exchange for relatively undemanding jobs tend 
to disproportionately find employment in the public 
sector because extra effort and unusual skills do not 
increase earnings . Consequently, there is a tendency for 
lower productivity among public workers. 
BERNARD ~ LENTZ 
Lentz believes that not enough emphasis and 
theoretical work has been done on developing a workable 
model of public wage determination that takes into 
account the political processes of patronage, collective 
bargaining, and civil service . He notes that: 
Public employment determination of terms and 
conditions of employment embodies not only an 
allocative function of service production, but 
.. moreover •.• a redistributive function which 
has as its basis the goal of political support 
and the winning of elections (Lentz, 1976, p. 
13). 
Lentz outlines certain anomilies with respect ot public 
sector employment. First, he states that public employee 
compensation exceeds private sector compensation. 
Secondly, government labor accession and separation 
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behavior differ widely 
Lastly, labor quality 
from private sector behavior . 
differences between public and 
private employment exist. 
In Lentz's model , the discussion centers around the 
chief executive officer of the government , whether it be 
the mayor or governor. That is where the "locus of 
effective control over government employment " lies (p. 
40). The objective of an executive official is to 
attempt to maximize his utility from the government which 
he controls. Because being elected is a necessary 
condition to the control of government, the derived 
demand of the elected official will be for votes at 
election time. Because elected officials are interested, 
like all employees , in job security and promotional 
opportunities, the fundamental assumption is that elected 
officials maximize long - run expected voter support . This 
is in contrast to the contention that output of 
traditionally defined public services 
instead (Lentz, 1981, p. 253) . 
is maximized 
The key point is that compensation and levels of 
employment in the public sector reflect "not only their 
productive services on the job, but also their political 
support activities" (Lentz, 1981, 254). As we have seen 
from Anthony Downs' model, uncertainty is prevalent in 
the electoral process. Most voters are suseptible to 
extensive manipulation by those who seek to persuade 
under the guise of helping them overcome their 
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uncertainty. Therefore, public employment 
decision-makers have wide discretion in seeking votes . 
One important and pertinent part of Lentz's study 
involves constraints. The chief executive who seeks to 
maximize long - run voter support is constrained from doing 
so by statutes and the state constitution. There are 
legislative constraints on appointive powers , budgetary 
powers , and enactment of legislation, and resource 
contraints on legal authorities to raise revenues and 
intergovernmental revenues, set tax bases, and issue 
debt. Civil service laws are a constraint on 
recruitment, establishment of individual and/or group 
compensation, and termination of employees, and 
collective bargaining laws and rules are a constraint on 
wages and conditions of emp loyment (Lentz, 1981, p. 
255) . 
Loyalty Bribe Theory 
The methods these public employers use to maximize 
long-run expected voter support given the constraints 
listed include patronage and the loyalty bribe and 
disloyality penalty. Patronage is the oldest and most 
efficient use of governmental revenues to purchase 
political loyalty and votes. patronage means not only 
the hiring of workers, but also 'purchases of goods and 
services, particularly capital construction from public 
sector firms ••.. • (Lentz, 1976, p. 53). 
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One of Lentz's most significant contributions to 
public sector wage determination involves his discussion 
of the loyalty bribe. He defines the loyalty bribe as: 
.. terms and conditions of employment superior 
to those offered the individual jobholder in 
private employment for the hours of public 
service (not vote) production superior in the 
sense of having a higher subjective expected 
value of job-related "goods" or a lower 
expected value of job "bads", other things 
being equal (Lentz, 1976, p. 55). 
The loyalty bribe theory says that public sector wages, 
salaries, and fringe benefits will be superior to those 
in the private sector if job security and hiring 
standards are the same in the public and private sectors. 
A public employer may give a job to an unqualified 
candidate in order to purchase his political support. 
Because political support is so important, wages do not 
necessarily have to be above normal. Other things such 
as productivity , quality of the worker, and fringe 
benefits may actually vary. In addition, the political 
job will be more important where unemployment is high or 
increasing and job opportunities are scarce (Lentz, 1981, 
255) . 
A disloyalty penalty is given to those who oppose a 
political candidate who wins. Dismissal is the most 
effective disloyalty penalty (Lentz, 1976, p . 55). 
Disloyalty penalties are found in accession and 
separation data. One motive to joining a public sector 
employee union or association is to prevent disloyalty 
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penalties. Job security provisions are now much stronger 
for public employees than for private ones. By gaining 
restrictions on disloyalty penalties through collective 
bargaining, public sector union leaders obtain support by 
public employees. One way to look at the demand for 
public employees is by examining the demand for political 
support by public employees and their union leaders. 
Political influence among workers and the power they 
possess are important to any accurate political picture 
on public employment levels and wages (Lentz, 1981, p. 
256). 
county ~ Levels in New York 
Lentz specifically defined a model to explain county 
pay levels in New York. The more one-sided party control 
of the jurisdiction was, the smaller the marginal vote 
product of an employee was. If vote marginal 
productivity was a determinant of county employee pay, 
then pay will be less where plurality is greatest (p. 
259). Another important determinant of the level of 
average earnings in county government employment was the 
percentage of employees who were potential patronage 
appointees (p. 260). He measured this percentage by 
examining the classification system under civil service 
law in New York. Interestingly enough, Lentz found that 
all but competitive classified employees 




Lentz (1981) proposed that the ability to threaten 
dismissal of public employees for failure to participate 
in campaign activities had a tendency to lower the amount 
of loyalty bribe that had to be paid to that employee. 
If the public job paid a wage in excess of the employee's 
opportunity wage , then the ability to threaten dismissal 
diminished the loyalty bribe necessary to be paid to an 
employee in the competitive classification, where the 
only incentive to participate in campaign activity was 
his or her own pay rate. If officials can threaten 
dismissal, pay rates go up slower than the case where 
officials have to give pay increases to workers in order 
to get them out to vote (Lentz, 1981, p. 262). 
One of Lentz's testable models was: 
W Bo + B,PATPRE + B~CAPL + BJENPOMO + B+MEDINC 
+ BS + PCINR 
where the variable meanings were: 
ENPOMO plurality party's % of total registration 
MEDINC median income 
PATPRE patronage proportion of total classified 
employment 
CAPL capital expenditure per worker 
PCINR Per capita intergovernmental 
revenues 
The dependent wage variables used were: 
AVOPA monthly ave. earnings of full and part -
time city employees 
FTP ave. monthly earnings of full-time 
equivalent county employee 
(Lentz , 1981 , pp. 263 - 264) 
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Lentz hypothesized that if PATPRE increased, county 
pay would decrease because it allowed elected officials 
to induce political participation by means other than by 
increasing pay . If ENPOMO increased, the wages would 
decrease because the vote marginal product was less. 
CAPL would increase average pay per worker. Finally, 
both an increase in PCINR and an increase in MEDINC would 
shift the demand for government services out. 





















All hypotheses worked as predicted. However , when a 
variable was included in the analysis which measured 
percent of county workers under collective bargaining 
agreements , al l variables except PATPRE and ENPOMO lost 
statistical sig n ificance . 
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When public wages exceed private wages or the 
opportunity wage , the expected long-run supply should 
drive wages down but not to the point of equality because 
public employees are expected to contribute some form of 
campaign activity. The larger the differential , the more 
campaign effort that can be extracted at the public ' s 
expense (Lentz, 1981, p. 268) . If government is able to 
circumvent competitive hiring restrictions, it will be 
able to get loyal supporters . Finally , if elected 
officials have the ability to fire employees when they 
are not reelected, "officials may extract campaign 
funds/efforts to the extent that employees will suffer 
lost income from being unemployed or employed at lower 
wages" (p. 268). This threat allows government to pay 
lower wages and keeps the cost of government down . 
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Chapter 4 
WAGE DIFFERENTIAL THEORY 
A discussion of the models of government behavior 
and public wage determination would not be complete 
without more specific examination of wage differential 
theory and empirical analysis. Walter Fogel and David 
Lewin (1974) argue that prevailing wage principles in 
government wage setting policies tend to bias public 
wages upward. Sharon Smith (1977) of Princeton 
University presents empirical evidence that male state 
government workers are paid eight percent more than 
private workers, and that female state government workers 
are paid 25% more than comparable private workers. She 
decomposes the wage differentials into an explanable part 
due to differences in characteristics and an unexplanable 
part due to economic rent paid to state government 
workers. Both studies provide useful insights into 
public wage determination. 
Fogel and Lewin (1974) argue that the existence of 
prevailing wage principles in setting wage rates and the 
political processes involved in wage setting "produce 
upwardly biased wage rates for most government jobs" 
(Fogel, 1974, p. 413). Fringe benefits in the public 
sector are often better or the same as those in the 
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private sector . Job hiring and tenure provide security 
for public workers. "Attractive wages and salaries , 
steady demand for public services , and tenure practices 
all combine to produce low rates of employee turnover" 
(p. 410). For instance, turnover in state and local 
government is 19% compared to 58% in manufacturing. 
Fogel and Lewin point out two weaknesses of public 
sector wage determination: lack of a motive for profit 
maximization and lack of a conventional demand curve. 
Public employees' demand curve is not expressed through a 
marginal revenue product curve. Instead, it is expressed 
indirectly through voter dema nd for public sector goods 
and directly through "political bargaining between 
governments and employee groups" (p. 414). Political 
bodies play to two constituencies. The first group is 
government employees, and the premise is that the larger 
the group, the more responsive decision makers will be. 
The second group consists of the general public, who 
is less informed on issues than government employees. 
Fogel and Lewin said: 
.. the combination of the 
government employees in 
diffusion of issues 
constituency creates 
upward bias in public 
direct interest of 
their wages and the 
among the general 
the potential for an 
sector wage rates (p. 
415). 
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Organizations of public employees will try to: first, 
create solidarity among workers; second , attempt to force 
the political body; and third, go to the public for 
support of its policies. One of the largest motivational 
factors underlying public employers is that public 
employees can determine to a certain extent through their 
votes and influence whether or not the employer retains 
his job . 
According to Table 3, there is proportionately more 
low wage employment in the private than in the public 
sector, there was an average of 41.8% of full -t ime 
workers in the U.S. who earned less than $7000. This is 
in contrast to 30 . 1 percent of state and local government 
workers who earn less than $7000. In addition , the 
pattern of high government pay for low skilled 
occupations may be more pronounced in suburban areas than 
in cities. 
Table 3 





Male 3.4 11.3 
Female 11. 4 45.0 
Average 5.8 21. 5 
Public Sector 
Male 1.5 7.2 
Female 4.4 20.3 
State and Local 
Gov't Average 2.6 12.4 
(Fogel , 1974, p. 418) 
$7000 







One of the major sources of relatively high wages in 
the public sector is the existence of prevailing wage 
principles which require, by law, that government workers 
be paid wages "comparable to those received by private 
employees performing similar work" (p. 411). This 
principle is equitable and efficient in theory because of 
an absence of product market discipline and the need to 
attract at least average quality employees to state 
government employment. However, to pay more than the 
private sector would be wasteful. 
There are numerous problems with the prevailing wage 
principle which upwardly bias wage rates. The principle 
requires smoothly functioning private labor markets . 
This belief is contrary to commonly held conceptions of 
labor markets. Non-competitive forces cause a range of 
wages to exist instead of just one. The problem is 
determining what wage in the range should be chosen. For 
instance, should it be the median or the average of the 
first quartile? 
Common practice is to pick medium to large-sized 
companies. This exclusion of small firms leads to an 
upward bias in wage surveys because larger firms tend to 
pay higher wages and low wage industries are 
under-represented. One commonly used wage survey is the 
National Survey of professional, Administrative, and 
Clerical ~, which uses a minimum requirement of 100-250 
employees for inclusion in the survey. However, 60% of 
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all non-farm private sector employees work in businesses 
with 250 employees or less. They get paid 15% - 20% less 
than those with 1000 or more employees (p. 417). 
Another problem is that the private sector wage may 
be depressed due to monopsonistic markets, 
discrimination , or an inability to move so that the 
government establishes rates above those prevailing in 
such markets in "hope that the scope of public employment 
efforts will be large enough to raise wages and improve 
working conditions in 'secondary markets'" (p. 412) . 
This is unlikely to happen where labor is highly elastic 
- such as low-skilled jobs. 
Government tends to match private market rates even 
where they have been raised by market power (uni ons) and 
even where lower wages would attract enough workers. 
Public sector pay rates are at least equal to those in 
private markets which were increased by supply-side 
power. 
At [the) state ... level ... through explicit 
policy or administrative practice , government 
craft employees are often paid construction 
industry rates and frequently only the union 
rates within construction (p. 423). 
Finally, wage setting practices do not take into 
account working conditions such as security, fringe 
benefits or other non-wage aspects of employment. 
Moreover, some public sector jobs do not have private 
sector counterparts. In some cases, parity arrangements 
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between wages of two sets of workers create a shortage of 
workers in one area and an excess in another due to 
differences in non-wage aspects of the job. For example, 
the parity arrangement between police and firemen, an 
arrangement followed by 60% of American municipalities in 
1969, tends to overpay firemen and underpay policemen (p. 
426). Of 1915 policemen appointed to the New York City 
Police department in 1957, 38% of those who left went to 
the fire department. On the other hand, no fireman ever 
left to go to the police department. 
Fogel and Lewin (1974) said that public sector wages 
tend to exceed private sector wages for all occupations 
except high level managers and professionals. 
conclude: 
Government employers frequently pay more than 
necessary to attract a work force at the low-
and middle - skill ranges and generally pay less 
than necessary to attract employees of average 
quality at th~ upper managerial and 
professional levels (Fogel, 1974, p. 430). 
SHARON SMITH 
They 
Sharon Smith's paper (1977) shows empirically that 
public sector wages are usually more than private wages 
and that the actual size depends on sex and the level of 
government . Smith decomposed wage differentials into a 
portion that was explained by differences in 
characteristics such as productivity and education and 
another portion that was unexplained . The unexplained 
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portion may be due to discrimination or the existence of 
economic rents as a result of political influence 
possessed by workers and the prevailing wage principle 
(Smith, 1977, p . 248). 
The decomposition of wage differentials was made by 
comparing the wage both types of workers would actually 
receive with what they would receive if both were paid 
according to the same wage structure . According to the 
~ ~ ~ 
model Wp= f~(X~, Z~), where W is the wage rate private 
sector workers would receive if they were paid according 
to the government wage structure . The government wage 
structure is f The vector of mean values of human 
capital investments by the private sector is X~, and the 
vector of mean values of other socioeconomic 
-characteristics of private sector workers is z# 
Likewise, W;= ff(X~, Z~), where W is the wage rate state 
government workers would get wit h the private wage 
structure (p. 253). 
Table 4 shows the results of Smith's empirical 
analysis of state government workers' wage levels. The 
sample used in the survey was of all individuals 16 years 
old or older who were not unemployed, who did not work 
less than ten hours a week, and who were not farmers, 






state wgts. Private wgts. 
Total wage 
differential 0.08 0.08 
Due to differences 
in characteristics 0.14 0.08 
Percentage 175.0 100.0 
Unexplained 
difference -0.06 0.0 
Percentage -75.0 0.0 
(Smith , 1977 , p . 260) 
Table 4 illustrates that if you take a private 
sector male worker and pay him according to the 
government wage structure , he would be paid eight percent 
less, where 14% of that difference is due to differences 
in characteristics of workers and negative six percent is 
due to the residual . When state weights are used , it 
appears that state male workers have more human capital 
investments and/or socionomic differences which explain 
some of the difference between public and private 
employees. State male workers are actually paid less 
than what would be encountered in the private sector 
given socioeconomic characteristics and human capital 
investments of public sector workers. However , when 
private weights or the opportunity cost of public 
employees is used instead of private weights , the eight 
percent difference is explained solely by differences in 
characteristics of workers. 
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Table 5 


















Private Wgts . 





Table 5 shows some interesting findings regarding 
female state workers. Female state workers were found to 
have an astonishing 25% wage differential over private 
female workers. When the female state worker's 
opportunity wage schedule is used, 12% or 48% of the 
total wage differential is explained by differences in 
characteristics. More than half of the wage differential 
is due to the residual. This finding strongly suggests 
that an economic rent is paid to female state government 
workers, or that discrimination exists in the public 
sector. 
In another analysis, Smith found that, in most 
cases, government wage differentials were less than 
private wage differentials with respect to race and 
Spanish origin (p. 256) . Table 6 s how s that the 
government actually exhibited more of a wage differential 
than the private sector for female blacks and other 








Tabl e 6 
Estimated Race Effects 
Black Nonwhite 
- 0 . 17 - 0 . 14 
(-13 . 69) (- 4.33 ) 
- 0.073 - 0 . 086 
( - 4.85) ( - 2.34 ) 
- 0 . 12 - 0 . 085 
( - 2 . 00) (- 0 .7 9) 
- 0.11 0 . 044 
(-2.39) (0.35 ) 
(Smith , 1977 , p. 256 ) 
Spanish 
- 0.19 
( - 11.79) 
- 0.15 
( - 7.21) 
0.44 
(0 . 49 ) 
- 0 . 10 
( - 0.86) 
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Smith also found that unionism tends to reduce the 
size of differentials between public and private sectors 
(p. 258) . She states that : 
. . in every case . .. in the absence of unionism , 
the rat i o of public to private pector wage 
rates would be even l arger than it is at 
present ( p . 25 7 ) . 
According to Table 7 , the effect of unions decreasing the 
wage differentia l between government and private workers 
is smaller for females , where it ranges between one and 
three percent , than for ma l es , where it ranges between 
six and eight percent. 
Tab l e 7 
Union wage Effects 
Sector 
Pr i vate 
state 
Ma l es 
0 . 25 
( 32 .77 ) 
0 . 1 2 




16 . 0 5 
( Smith , 1 977, p . 257) 
Females 
0 . 22 
(18 . 50) 
0 . 081 
(1. 68) 
% 
Unio n ized 
1 4 . 3 1 
16. 5 
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The reduced size of wage differentials due to unions 
is partly explained by the absence of right to strike 
laws, which vitiate most of the strength of unions. 
Another part of the explanation is that union wage 
effects are passed on more easily to non-union workers in 
the public than in the private sector (p. 258). Smith 
concludes that: 
.. neither the politics of government pay 
setting nor the implementation of the 
prevailing wage policy has succeeded in 
achieving equal wages for workers of comparable 
productivity and that male state ... government 
workers are underpaid relative to their private 
sector counterparts (Smith, 1977 , p. 263) . 
Chapter 5 
PATRONAGE IN PENNSYLVANIA 
Pennsylvania has long 
vehemently contested partisan 






It was one of 
civil service 
systems . For many years, the number of non-civil service 
employees far exceeded the number of civil service 
employees. This environment of partisan politics and the 
existence of a large number of patronage employees 
resulted in skillful use of patronage positions by 
seasoned politicians. To this day , despite a large 
number of civil service employees , almost 35% of state 
employment is non - civil service. Patronage use still 
exists in Pennsylvania in such offices as the Auditor 
General, Treasurer , and Attorney General , and such 
departments as the Department of Transportation and the 
Department of Public Welfare . 
Just recently , the Auditor General ' s office was 
subject to an investigation concerning a $200 , 000 job 
selling scheme . On June 3D , 1984, John Kerr , the number 
two official in the Auditor General ' s office, was 
convicted of 139 counts of bribery and related offences . 
Two hundred thousand dollars had been raised by selling 
42 jobs , promotions , and raises (Morello , Kerr Jury . . . , 
1984) . One juror in the trial said , ' There ' s no doubt 
money was passed . Jobs were bought and sold. Promotions 
page 56 
were bought and sold ' ( Morello, Kerr Guilty ... , 1984). 
Al Benedict, the Auditor Gener 1 of pennsylvania, 
used patronage to maximize his long-run expected voter 
support . While Benedict was running for Auditor Gener 1 
in 1984 , he added 115 employees to his payroll . Although 
Benedict ' s budget only allowed him 823 employees , he had 
a total of 874 at the time of the election t an extra 
cost of over $1 , 000,000 (Ferrick , 1984). Prior to th 
primary , Benedict hired 11 new employees , all of whom 
were Philadelphia committeemen from wards that ended up 
voting for Benedict in the primary . Fiv of the 11 were 
on the placed on the payroll eight days b for th 
e l ection. Benedict succeeded in capturing 68% of th 
vote in the primary . 
Furthermore , Benedict was successful t raising 
campaign funds from empl oyees on the AudLtor General ' s 
office payroll . According to campaign records , during 
1956 Benedict received $9500 per month from his 
employees . In each of the first four months of 1984 , 
Auditor General ' s office employees donated an average of 
$18 , 500 . In total , over $187 ,00 0 had been collected from 
the Auditor General ' s office employees - a considerable 
amount (Ferrick , 1984). As the Philadelphia Inquirer 
reported , 
It's t he old school of muscle politics .... his 
recent hirings a nd his campaign reports show 
that in Benedict's case , it ... means a heavy 
reliance on patronage , which ca n be us d to 
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create a corps of supporters - both political 
and financial (Ferrick, 1984 , p. IB). 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
In the beginning, the Civil Service commission 
supplied emp loyees for the Department of Public 
Assistence , Bureau of Employment Security, and the Liquor 
Control Board. It also administered examinations for 
state police applicants. Many of the non - civil service 
positions were filled through the Governor ' s personnel 
office from applicants identified and sponsored by the 
county chairmen. Other positions were reserved for the 
county chairmen; for example , the Department of Welfare 
and the Department of Highways (as PennDot used to be 
called). Top administrative positions were appointed by 
the Governor (Cooper, 1982). 
According to Governor Leader's pre-inaugural studies 
in the 1950's, civil service was needed in pennsylvania 
to improve the states's ability to recruit quality 
people. For instance, one year pennsylvania state 
government needed 12 foresters. That same year, 50 
foresters graduated from the Penn State School of 
Forestry, but only one joined Pennsylvania state 
government. There were needs for skilled accountants, 
engineers, and neutral health professionals. 
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This lack of upper - level appointees is not uncommon 
in state government. Among other things, salary-setting 
methods and political pressures cause top management in 
state government to receive less competitive wages than 
those in middle management and the lower levels of the 
bureaucracy . Often top positions tend to be unclassified 
so that "incumbents are likely to be dismissed with 
changes in administration" (Crane, 1976, p. 55). As a 
result of civil service, 
.. the parties adjusted to decreases in 
patronage positions and the realization that 
civil service is essential for effective 
government and not merely a way for the 
majority party to assure its members permanent 
state employment (Cooper , 1982, p . 181). 
PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS 
The growth of unions and the advent of collective 
bargaining in the public sector in the 1970 ' s led to 
numerous changes in state government , especially in 
Pennsylvania . According to Sharon Smith of Princeton 
University (1977), public unions have a considerable 
effect on relative earnings. A state cannot avoid high 
labor costs by moving its operation to another 
geographical area like private sector firms can . Smith 
estimates that public sector unions increase wages by 
eight to twelve percent , whereas private sector unions 
raise wages an average of 23 . 5%. 
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On July 23, 1970, Act 195 or the Public Employee 
Relations Act was enacted by the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania. It authorized a 101-day bargaining process 
and strikes by most public employees. Act 195 was 
extended to 800,000 state and local employees. Police and 
firemen were exempt. The anti-strike law of 1947 was 
abandoned because of its ineffectiveness at precluding 
strikes by public employees. In 1968, there had been 13 
strikes, and there had been another 26 strikes in 1969. 
Two massive teacher strikes had occurred in 1968 in 
Pittsburgh and Scranton. 
Act 195 doomed state patronage politics. On November 
4, 1971, the American Federation of State , County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) became the major bargaining 
agent. AFSCME started the process by getting 108,000 
workers protected from arbitrary dismissal for political 
reasons (Beers, 1980). In 1975, AFSCME represented 64.5% 
of Pennsylvania state employees; that figure dropped to 
60.7% by 1982. Over one - third of that amount were in 
clerical, administrative, and fiscal units (1983 
Governor's ... , 1983, p . 29) . As of July 1982, the 
average salary of an AFSCME worker was $16,223 with an 
additional average annual benefit cost of $6431 for a 
total of $22,654 (Governor's . .. , 1983, p . 31) . 
assists in 
.. providing financial, organizational, and 
manpower resources for voter registration 
drives, preparation and dissemination of 
campaign literature, and get-out-the vote 
activities in support of candidate campaigns 
AFSCME 
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Through its Department of Legislative and Political 
Action, AFSCME engages in political training in dealing 
with legislative developments of interest to itself . 
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) is an 
important regulatory board governing labor relations 
between public employers and employees in pennsylvania. 
It has the authority to call new elections when improper 
practices such as wage and benefit increases shortly 
before an election have affected the outcome of an 
election. The PLRB adjudicates unfair labor practice 
charges such as "discrimination in regard to hiring or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage organization" (~ 
Sunset ... , 1983, p. 10). In 1982, the PLRB election 
time period was 128 days - the longest among other states 
with similar boards . It also averaged almost four months 
to process an unfair labor practice charge; only Florida 
was longer for this figure (~ Sunset ... , 1983, p . 17). 
Pennsylvania is a state with population of 
approx i mately 11,785,000 and a labor force of 5,364,000. 
State government employment usually is around 100,000 
workers . The average commonwealth salaried worker is 42 
years old , has eight and one-thi rd years experience on 
the job, ea~ns $14,230, and has one in ten chances of 
leaving his job this year (1979 Governor's ... , 1979). 
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Two out of three salaried workers are civil service while 
one out of five is primarily federally funded. Six out 
of ten are at the last step of their pay range. Nine out 
of ten have jobs by union contract. State government 
workers are 53% white males , 36% white females, 4% 
minority males, and 7% minority female. 
Pennsylvania ranks fourth in population, fourth in 
number of state workers, 47th in number of state workers 
per 10,000 population, and 13th in average salary (1979 
Governor's ... , 1979). Ever since an employment high of 
111,685 in May 1975, state employment has dropped 
steadily. Between 1973 and 1978, the average salary grew 
48.6%, which was less than the 50.4% increase in the 
Consumer Price Index. As of October 1981, the average 
salary of full-time Pennsylvania employees was $17,926 
compared to the national average of $18,084. 
Pennsylvania is on the low end of the scale which 
measures percent of state and local government workers by 
state . In 1980, pennsylvania had less than 13% of its 
jobs in state and local government (Tucker, 1981, p . 
22) . 
Table 8 shows Pennsylvania state government 
employment from 1963 to 1985. Total filled positions and 
salaried positions rose steadily through the 1960's and 
early 1970's till total filled positions peaked in 1976 
with 115,194 and salaried positions peaked with 110,748. 
As of January 1, 1985, total filled positions in 
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Pennsylvania state government are at only 89,474 the 
lowest it has been since 1967. The drastic change in 
wage positions from 1967 to 1968 was due to the 
conversion of a substantial number of wage positions, 
primarily within the Department of Treansportation, to 
salaried positions. Since 1968, wage positions have 
generally continued to grow steadily until a peak of 7312 
in 1982. 
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Table 9 illustrates the growth in civil service 
positions in pennsylvania state government over a 20 year 
period from 1963 to 1983. According to the table, both 
the number of total filled positions and civil service 
positions in state government peaked in 1976 with a high 
of 115,194 and 77,312, respectively. A large increase in 
the percentage civil service took place between 1963 and 
1964 under a civil service act passed on August 27, 1963. 
Since 1964, the percentage civil service has hovered 
around 65%. According to Table 9, it peaked in 1972. 
However, the most recent data (although not available for 
inclusion in Table 9) specify the percentage of state 
employees who are civil service in July 1984 as 71% (1985 
Legislative ... , 1985, p. 60). 
Table 9 
percentage Civil Service 
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Source: 1985 Legislative ... , Pennsylvania 
Abstract 
PUBLIC ~ PRIVATE EARNINGS 
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One of the most assertions made by economists 
examining public wages is that public employee wages 
often exceed those earned by comparable workers in the 
private sector. The following tables illustrate that, to 
a large extent: 1) Pennsylvania state employees earn 
more than New Jersey state employees based on comparable 
data in 1976, 2) pennsylvania state employees earn more 
in the highly non-civil service Department of 
Transportation than comparable positions in New Jersey, 
and 3) relative monthly earnings of Pennsylvania state 
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workers greatly exceed those in the private sector . All 
three propositions are consistent with the economic 
models presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Table 10 shows that the average wage earned by 
pennsylvania state workers exceeded the average wage 
earned by New Jersey state workers . The average 
estimated mean was $863.44 for pennsylvania compared to 
$812 . 33 for New Jersey . In pennsylvania , 60% of all 
workers are paid at the maximum pay rate possible under 
law ( 1 983 Gove r nor ' s ... , 1983) . It was assumed for 
estimation purposes that the other 40% were located at 
the midpoint of the range between the maximum and minimum 
pay rate . Therefore , the estimated average mean was 
determined by the following equation : 
A 
X = . 40 * (min + ( max - mi n /2) ) + .60 * (max) . 
Comparab l e figures were calculated for both Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey . 
Table 10 
Relative Monthly Earnings 




position X $/hr. X $/hr. 
------------------------------------------------------ -
Stenographer $719.40 $4.46 $601.00 $3.99 
Typist 692.00 4.29 576.20 3.83 
File Clerk 669.00 4.15 530.80 3.53 
Account Clerk 748.80 4.64 574.20 3.83 
Tabulating 
Machine 
Operator 748.80 4.64 601.00 3.99 
Computer 
Programmer 1280.40 7.94 1311.20 8 .71 
Computer 
Operator 852.40 5.29 844 .80 5.61 
Nurse 994.00 5.78 958.60 5.57 
Carpenter 931. 00 5.77 978.60 5.69 
Electrician 931. 00 5.77 978.60 5.69 
Automotive 
Mechanic 931. 00 5.77 978.60 5.69 
------- -------
AVERAGE $863.44 $5.32 $812.33 $5.10 
-------------------------------------------------------
Source: Pay Rates in the Public Service, Jan. 1976 
According to Table 10, pennsylvania state workers 
earned more on a monthly basis than did New Jersey state 
workers for all positions except computer programmer , 
carpenter, electrician, and automotive mechanic. 
Pennsylvania state employees worked an average of 37.5 
hours a week; only nurses worked 40 hours a week. New 
Jersey state employees worked either 35 hours (white 
collar) or 40 hours (blue collar) a week. On a hourly 
basis, pennsylvania state workers earned more than New 
Jersey workers in all positions except computer 
programmer and computer operator. Pennsylvania state 
workers made only an average of $.08 more per hour than 
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New Jersey state workers. The difference in monthly 
wages among blue collar workers was explained largely by 
the difference in hours worked. 
Table 11 compares positions that are most likely to 
be found in the highly non-civil service Department of 
Transportation. Once again , Pennsylvania state employees 
were paid more than comparable New Jersey state employees 
except for engineer aide and heavy equipment operator. 
When hours worked was taken into account , New Jersey 
state employees exceeded those in Pennsylvania only in 
the position of heavy equipment operator. The average 
estimated monthly salary among these workers was $1006.48 
for Pennsylvania and $909.40 for New Jersey. For the 
positions listed in Table 11, Pennsylvania state 
employees averaged one dollar an hour more than New 
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Source: Pay Rates in the Public Service, Jan. 1976 
Page 68 
Finally, Table 12 compares relative earnings for 
comparable positions in the public and private sector. 
Comparable data for the private sector for the same time 
period were only available in the Philadelphia - New 
Jersey - Metropolitan area. Because data for the private 
sector in the Harrisburg area would have been more 
appropriate for comparison purposes and such data are not 
availab l e , it should be kept in mind when scrutinizing 
the private sector pay rates in Table 12 that relative 
private wages are biased upwardly. 
According to Table 12, 
monthly wage is $852.29 
the average public 
compared to $840 .44 
sector 
in the 
private sector. Similarly, the average hourly rate is 
$5.25 in the public sector and $5.15 per hour in the 
private sector. At first glance, these figures do not 
appear to be substantial until the data are more closely 
examined. For all of the white collar positions except 
tabulating machine operator and registered nurse, monthly 
averages in the public sector greatly exceed the private 
wage. It is the private blue collar workers' wage that 
exceed the public sector's wage. This has a tendency to 
balance out the wage differential between public and 
private white collar worker's earnings. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the laborer position pays $1.11 
more per hour in Pennsylvania state government than in 

























Relative Monthly Earnings 
Public v. Private 
/I Public 
X $/hr. 
$719 . 40 





















5 . 77 
5.77 
5 . 77 
5.52 
4.29 




508 . 00 





942 . 00 
1170.68 
1128.75 
1180 . 35 
1027.16 
512 . 78 
$840.44 














Source: Pay Rates in the Public Service , Jan. 1976 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYS I S 
Frank Sorauf (1956) reported in "State Patronage in 
a Rural County" that replacement of patronage or 
non- civ i l service positions in the Department of 
Transportation began after the election of a new party to 
the governorship . He determined that eight months after 
such an election , 1 4% of the non - civil service jobholders 
switched their registration in hope of keeping their 
jobs . It was not uncommon for jobholders to be fired in 
order that loyal party members of the new party in power 
could be rewarded for their successful effort in the 
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camPFign . 
A regression was completed to determine the extent 
to which government employees (especially non-civil 
service employees) switched their voter registration 
after the election of a new party to power. The first 
two regressions quantified the total effect of vote 
switching after the election. The following equation 




B. + B,TP78 + Ba PD78, and 
A. + A,TP62 + A~PD62, 
where the definition of the variables are: 
TP78 ratio of total employees to total 
registration in 1978 
TP62 ratio of total employees to total 
registration in 1962 
PD78 percent Democrat registration in '78 
PD62 percent Democrat registration in '62 
PD80 percent Democrat registration in '80 
PD64 percent Democrat registration in '64 
The two regressions provide information regarding 
vote switching during similar periods of time, although 
the periods are 16 years apart. In both cases, a 
Republican governor was preceded two years before by a 
Democratic governor in Pennsylvania. Governor Richard 
Thornburgh, a Republican had been in control of state 
government for two years after Governor Milton Shapp, a 
Democrat. Likewise in 1964, William Scranton, a 
Republican, had been in power two years after the term of 
a Democrat, Governor Lawrence. 
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According to the model , TP78 and TP62 should have 
negative coefficients. An increase in the ratio of total 
employees to total registration should lead to a decrease 
in percent Democrat in the periods examined . presumably , 
vote switching has occurred and led to a decrease in 
Democratic registration after the election of a 
Republican governor. 
Table 13 and Table 14 illustrate the results of 
these two regressions. A 1% increase in TP78 leads to a 
.14% decrease in PD80. Similarly , a 1% increase in TP62 
leads to a .23 % decrease in PD64. The fact that the 
coefficients for TP62 and TP78 decreased from .23 in 1962 
to .14 in 1978 is both interesting and important. One 
may attribute the decrease to any number of factors: 
collective bargaining, unions, and civil service . For 
instance, in 1962 more than half of state employees were 
















































( - 2.36 ) 
.979 
(48.38 ) 
Therefore, a third and final regression was 
completed to determine the extent to which voter 
registration switches are due to political pressure on 
non-civil service employees and the effect of increases 
in the proportion of civil service employees in state 
government. The following equation was estimated using 
the least ordinary squares method: 
PD80 = Co + C,NSP8 + C~CSP8 + CJ PD78, 





percent Democrat in 1980 
non- civil service ratio to 
total registration in 1980 
civil service ratio to total 
registration in 1980 
percent Democrat in 1978 
The hypothesis put forth is that the proportion of 
non-civil service positions available in state government 
employment has a direct influence on the amount of voter 
registration switching that takes place . The period of 
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time of the data corresponds to the first regression 
analysis because county data were not available in 1964. 
The results presented in Table 15 show that this 
hypothesis is indeed accurate. A 1% increase in the NSP8 
leads to a statistically significant .60% decrease in 
PD80. Correspondingly , a 1% increase in CSP8 results in 
a . 14% decrease in PD80 , although it is not statistically 















Dependent Variable: PD80 
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Patronage is used by politicians to help the party 
in control of the government maximize votes . Politicians 
use patronage to build up their own set of followers and 
elicit campaign activity and funds. In its heyday , 
politicians would expect five dollars of a state 
employees salary to go toward the party. If non-civil 
service employees refused to donate campaign funds or 
participate in election activities , they could be 
dismissed from their duties by the ruling party. 
Likewise, if a new party gained control of the 
government, the patronage could expect to be replaced 
with loyal party members from the other party. 
However, merit systems and unions have made inroads 
into the patronage system. The old system of politics 
has been replaced with people who are more highly 
motivated to work for the party because of the atmosphere 
and excitement of political contests. The arena is made 
up of interest groups and political action committees 
instead of patronage employees. Campaigning has become 
more centralized and media - oriented. The political 
'non-job', whether it be a nomination or an invitation to 
a banquet, serves to motivate voters to get involved in 
the political process. Notwithstanding all this, Gump 
(1971) did find in his study of patronage in Ohio that 
patronage was of some value in 
organization , getting campaign 




itself to economic Government behavior lends 
analysis and model building. Human beings mold and 
reshape government as an institution to serve their 
needs. An adequate understanding of government processes 
and public wage determination is essential to predicting 
behavior in the future. Only by being able to understand 
and predict human behavior can we begin to take control 
of institutions around us. Anthony Downs ' theory of 
democracy and his understanding of the role of 
uncertainty in the political processes , Melvin Reder's 
highly theoretical model of vote maximization and its 
implications on public wage determination, and Bernard F . 
Lentz's model of public wage determi nation that takes 
into account the political processes of patronage , 
collective bargaining, and civil service all increase our 
understanding of government behavior and help us better 
predict the consequences of people 's actions. 
The discussion in Chapter 4 on wage differential 
theory by Sharon Smith (1977) of Princeton University and 
Walter Fogel and David Lewin (1974) help to increase 
further our understanding of wages in the public sector . 
The existence of true wage differentials between the 
public and private sector contributes some knowledge 
about government behavior. One explanation is that he 
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wage differential is a result of vote production activity 
required on the part of public employees. Another 
explanation is that wage differentials are caused by 
relatively low wages in the private sector due to 
monopsonistic markets or discrimination. Finally, wage 
differentials may show that an economic rent is paid to 
public employees for any number of reasons. 
The discussion on Pennsylvania attempted to provide 
concrete evidence of wage differentials, patronage 
activity, and vote maximization in state government. The 
growth of civil service in pennsylvania has lead to a 
decrease in the number of patronage employees and a 
general decline in the importance of patronage in state 
government. The passage of Act 195 played an important 
role in limiting the scope of patronage and restricting 
arbitrary dismissal for political purposes . Despite all 
this , pockets of patronage continue to exist in 
Pennsylvania, and patronage is still utilized by a few 
skillful practitioners such as Al Benedict of the Auditor 
General ' s office. An econometric analysis of vote 
switching lead to the conclusion that a statistically 
significant amount of vote switching occurs after an 
election by non - civil service employees in Pennsylvania. 
No discussion of government behavior and public wage 
determination can be complete and answer all the 
questions that need to be answered . It is the author's 
hope that discussions and i nquiries such as this will 
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spur future investigations and economic analysis of 
government decision- making . 
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